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Abstract. Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) enables the delegation
of entire business processes to third party providers. Such scenarios
involve communication between federated and heterogeneous workﬂow
engines. However, state-of-the-art workﬂow engines fall short of a dis-
tributed authorisation mechanism for this heterogeneous, federated BPO
setting.
In a cross-organisational context, the security requirements involve
(i) delegation and veriﬁcation of privileges in a conﬁdential manner,
(ii) secure asynchronous operations during the long-term workﬂows even
when the users are logged-oﬀ, and (iii) controlling access to interfaces of
the diﬀerent workﬂow engines involved.
To address these challenges, we present a voucher-based authorisation
architecture and middleware. We extended the WF-Interop [2] middle-
ware with a security module to support this authorisation architecture.
We further validated our contributions by prototyping a billing workﬂow
case study on top of the extended WF-Interop middleware and evaluated
the performance overhead of the security extensions to the middleware.
Keywords: Security middleware · Authorization · Business process
1 Introduction
Software service providers are evolving towards a Business Process Outsourcing
(BPO) model. BPO refers to delegation of entire business processes to third party
providers. Providers take over the complete business functions and are free to
choose the implementations; consumers only receive the results of processes [2,
6,11,25].
For example, accounting departments of many companies outsource their
billing processes to external service providers. These processes comprise activities
such as documenting, shipment and payment. For instance, (1) an accounting
manager submits an order to send some bills by the end of the month. (2) The
billing process gets started at the provider’s side by the accounting department.
The service provider takes over the entire process. (3) They print and package
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the bills. Afterwards, (4) they start a delivery process at a shipping company.
The accounting department periodically inspects the running processes at the
provider for progress updates to know the current status of the bills (e.g. sent,
resent, paid, etc.).
Supplier
Financier
Buyer
(1)
(2)
(3) (5)
(7)
1. The buyer purchases some products.
2. The supplier delivers the products with invoices.
3. The buyer starts a reverse factoring process.
4. The financier asks for the supplier's decision.
5. The supplier confirms the process.
6. The financier makes an early payment to the supplier.
7. The buyer pays back on a due date.(6)
(4)
Fig. 1. Reverse Factoring (RF)
Reverse Factoring (RF) in the FinTech sector is another example of such a
process. Reverse Factoring enables companies to pay their bills on time with
assistance of ﬁnanciers (also called brokers), see Fig. 1. In brief, (1) a buyer
purchases some products from a supplier; (2) the supplier sends a bill to the buyer
with a due date; the buyer wants to pay the bill on time to ensure their business
continuity; (3) they therefore request a ﬁnancier to get ﬁnancial assistance; (4,
5) the ﬁnancier evaluates the request in ﬁrst place; then they negotiate with
the supplier for their decision. If all parties reach an agreement on this process,
(6) the ﬁnancier pays the buyer’s bill before its due date; and instead, (7) the
buyer will pay the bill to the ﬁnancier with an extended due date, perhaps with
interest. Buyer companies tend to employ BPO in order to outsource the entire
process to a provider (a broker/ﬁnancier) to be able to concentrate on their core
business. The Reverse Factoring scenario is the running example in this section.
Each of the business processes gets executed over diﬀerent workﬂow engines
located in diﬀerent companies. These heterogeneous workﬂow engines have their
own business-speciﬁc security mechanisms to protect their sensitive data and
control the access rights. The diversity of technologies used in workﬂow man-
agement systems across the BPO parties introduces interoperability issues with
respect to service computing in general, and security in particular. Heydari et al.
[2] outlines the common patterns among such BPO scenarios as follows.
– Multiple parties are involved in BPO model, resulting in federated, heteroge-
neous workﬂow engines.
– Outsourced processes are long running workﬂows, e.g. taking days or weeks
to be completed.
– Occasionally, the client parties inspect the progress of outsourced processes.
On the one hand, most of the security mechanisms in workﬂow engines
are used to meet the intra-organisational requirements, e.g. Role Based Access
Control (RBAC) [9]. On the other hand, the federated, cross-organisational
approaches in more general context (e.g. WS-Trust [19]) do not particularly take
A Voucher-Based Security Middleware for Secure BPO 21
all of the process outsourcing characteristics into account. Such characteristics
include hierarchical and iterative delegation of privileges, human-involvement,
organisational conﬁdentiality, long-running workﬂows or asynchronous opera-
tions without active sessions (see Fig. 2).
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Start a RF process
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Delegation of the 
authorised actions
to be performed on suppliers
Supplier
engine
Authorised 
actions
Performing an action
Privilege delegation
Fig. 2. Reverse Factoring (RF)
The scope and contribution of this paper is a security architecture and mid-
dleware that support following authorisation requirements and features in a BPO
setting with federated, heterogeneous workﬂow engines.
1. Delegation and validation of all or subsets of authorised privileges (access
rights) to other involved people or executing, federated workﬂow engines. For
example, an accounting manager (buyer company) delegates the progress
inspection privilege to an accountant; or an accounting workﬂow engine dele-
gates a subset of its BPO functional rights (e.g. starting a process at a seller)
to a ﬁnancier engine.
2. Secure asynchronous operations during long-term workﬂows even when the
users are logged oﬀ. For example, an accounting engine in a buyer com-
pany may require to perform an action (e.g. start/inspect a process) when
the accountant is not logged in and there is no actual session available in
the execution context of the engine. Therefore, there should be a way for the
buyer’s engine to authenticate against the ﬁnancier’s engine and perform the
authorised actions.
3. Controlling access to interfaces of workﬂow engines in the context of BPO. For
example, when an accounting manager starts a Reverse Factoring process,
an accountant should not be able to cancel the process, but only inspect it.
That constraint should be reﬂected to the accounting workﬂow engine by the
application interface (API) of the ﬁnancier’s workﬂow engine.
To address these requirements, we present an access and enforcement mech-
anism as an integral part of the BPO model and middleware. This system works
with vouchers (also called tokens or assertions), i.e. a digital representation of a
claim or set of claims which has been certiﬁed by a particular entity [22]. Vouch-
ers establish a decentralised authorisation management that aims to provide
trust and security assurance to the involved parties in BPO scenarios.
To validate the voucher system, we implemented a security module for the
WF-Interop middleware [2], i.e. a middleware interfacing heterogeneous and fed-
erated workﬂow engines in a uniﬁed RESTful architecture to support the BPO
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use cases. The security module enables BPO consumers and providers (1) to
manage (i.e. produce or delegate) security vouchers and (2) to verify the privi-
leges and integrity of vouchers for each service call.
Furthermore, WF-Interop has a hypermedia-driven application interface,
meaning that it enables the service consumers to discover the capabilities of
underlying workﬂow engines by oﬀering pointers to the next possible actions
upon each service invocation. For example, if a consumer, via WF-Interop, starts
a workﬂow instance in a Ruote [17] engine, WF-Interop embeds hyperlinks of
other related actions such as pause and abort in the response. The capabil-
ity propositions are based on the underlying engine, the type, the state of the
process, and most importantly, the access right of the entity identity. Hence the
security module securely controls the consumer-specific action propo-
sitions based on the voucher content.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the neces-
sary background about business processes and BPO, as well as an overview of
related work in the authorisation domain. Section 3 introduces a voucher-based
architecture to achieve secure BPO. Section 4 validates the aforementioned con-
cepts and the security extensions to the WF-Interop middleware by a billing
workﬂow case study. Section 5 evaluates the WF-Interop extensions in terms of
performance. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we present a brief overview of workﬂows1 and Business Process
Outsourcing (BPO). Afterwards, the WF-Interop [2] middleware is described,
including the key interfaces and hypermedia-driven architecture. In addition,
the related work in the domain of security protocols and frameworks for authen-
tication and authorisation are presented.
2.1 Background on BPO and WF-Interop
A business process is a group of activities that, once completed, will accomplish
an organisational goal. For example, when you purchase a product online, you
start a business process of purchase. This business process contains activities
such as order placement, bank transfer, inventory checks and shipment. Once all
are completed, you receive the product (the main goal).
A process deﬁnition is a representation of what is intended to happen [5],
described by a business process modelling language such as BPMN. It contains
a sequence of activities showing the order, relationships and semantics of the
business process. Workﬂow engines execute the activities of process deﬁnitions.
For each round of execution, an instance of a deﬁnition is created, holding a set
of context-speciﬁc variables. Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) refers to dele-
gation of entire business process to third party providers. Process deﬁnitions get
deployed, instantiated and then executed entirely by diﬀerent workﬂow engines.
1 In this paper, we use the terms business process and workflow interchangeably.
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WF-Interop is a middleware interfacing heterogeneous and federated work-
ﬂow engines in a uniﬁed RESTful architecture aiming at facilitating BPO.
Heydari et al. [2] describes WF-Interop, which has three interfaces: (i) deploy-
ment, i.e. enabling consumers to manage process deﬁnitions; (ii) activation, i.e.
enabling consumers to activate process instances; (iii) progress monitoring, i.e.,
enabling them to monitor the progress of running instances. Accordingly, all
workﬂow activities are delegated to the third parties and the level of communi-
cation of BPO clients is limited to coarse-grained interactions provided by the
interfaces.
Hypermedia-driven interfaces in BPO. WF-Interop interfaces leverage well-
known principles such as Hypermedia as the Engine of Application State
(HATEOAS). In brief, when a BPO consumer calls a service function from one
of the WF-Interop interfaces, WF-Interop embeds some navigational informa-
tion (a set of links) in the response. For example, the Ruote workﬂow engine
supports a set of functionalities on process instances such as start, get, pause,
resume and abort. A BPO consumer calls the start functionality (from the
activation interface) of WF-Interop. The WF-Interop middleware acts as a
facade to several workﬂow engines and provides a uniform, coherent abstraction
for consumers. Therefore, for this request it uses the built-in adapter for Ruote
and starts a process. The process instantiation is an asynchronous service call,
meaning that WF-Interop responds to the request initiator earlier than the com-
plete process instantiation. In the body of the response, it embeds {get, abort}
as the relevant navigational links. If the consumer calls the get function for that
process instance after a while (when the process is instantiated), WF-Interop
proposes {get, abort, pause} in the response. The capability propositions of
WF-Interop are based on the underlying engine, the type, and the state of the
process.
2.2 Related Work
Workﬂow engines support diﬀerent access control models. Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) [9] is an access control mechanism that comprises users’ roles
and privileges. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [13] employs a more ﬂex-
ible paradigm by use of policies combining attributes and producing boolean logic
outcomes. Business processes beneﬁt from these mechanisms for authorisation
of users’ actions and restricting the access to resources in an intra-organisational
context [3,23]. WS-HumanTask [10] has an emphasis on the human-involvement
in business processes by providing roles illustrating actions that users can per-
form on tasks. Other approaches to access control for resources in a workﬂow
context are studied in [18]. Considering the delegation of roles and access rights,
some studies presented delegation models and frameworks for RBAC [24,26];
moreover, an extensive comparison of delegation models in a business context
is provided in this review [21]. Most of these works did not take the cross-
organisational characteristics of business process outsourcing into account.
WS-Trust [19] introduces a Security Token Service responsible for issuing
tokens. It establishes a broker trust relationship among participants involved in
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distributed systems. Recently the state of practice has moved towards the OAuth
2.0 authorisation framework [12]. Through diﬀerent ﬂows, OAuth2 enables third
party applications to have limited authorised access to services on behalf of
the resource owners by providing access tokens. To harden the authorisation
mechanism presented in OAuth2, OpenID Connect [20] adds an identity layer
on top of the OAuth2 protocol in order to provide authentication.
Another improvement is to employ Macaroons [4] to structure each OAuth2
token. Macaroons embed caveats (i.e. that deﬁnes speciﬁc authorisation require-
ments), as well as attenuation and contextual conﬁnement of authorisation
requests. The proof-carrying characteristic of Macaroons is based on an HMAC-
based construction inspired by Merkle-Damg˚ard hash function.
In the public-key-based area, SPKI/SDSI [8] employs name and namespace
certiﬁcates to deﬁne identities, and authorisation certiﬁcates (delegatable by
subjects) to deﬁne what each principal is allowed to do. To perform an action
on a secure api, a certiﬁcate chain needs to be provided by the subjects.
All of the given mechanisms focus on authorisation and authentication of
parties in a generic context which can be applied to business processes in general
and BPO in particular. But most of the mechanisms support some or none of
the cross-organisational characteristics of a BPO context with federated workﬂow
engines. For example, the lacking characteristics include hierarchical structure of
authorisation, conﬁdential assertions, long-running workﬂows with asynchronous
operations, and secure proposition ﬁltering of HATEOAS which is used in the
BPO middleware.
3 Secure BPO
In this section, we describe a security architecture and middleware for the three
requirements deﬁned in Sect. 1:
1. Delegation and validation of access rights using a voucher-based approach.
2. Secure asynchronous operations by workﬂow engines when the executing user
is logged-oﬀ.
3. Secure ﬁltering of HATEOAS propositions in BPO APIs.
The features of this security architecture are implemented as extension to
the WF-Interop middleware and are applied to the communication between het-
erogeneous and federated workﬂow engines. In Sect. 3.1, we present the voucher
structure, as well as how it facilitates the delegation and veriﬁcation of privi-
leges. In Sect. 3.2, the secure asynchronous operations are described. The secure
ﬁltering of HATEOAS propositions is explained in Sect. 3.3.
3.1 Delegation and Validation of Access Rights
We present a voucher-based authentication and authorisation protocol that
establishes an architecture aiming to provide delegation and validation of access
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rights in BPO scenarios. In this subsection, we describe (i) the structure of a
voucher; (ii) the procedure of voucher delegations; (iii) the voucher veriﬁcation
steps; and lastly (iv) the renewal procedures.
Voucher Structure. “A claim is a statement that something is the case, without
being able to give proof” [1]. A voucher (also called token or assertion) is a digital
representation of a claim or set of claims which has been certiﬁed by a particular
entity2 [22]. In addition to the non-repudiation3 characteristic common among
similar works [15], our vouchers contribute a set of features:
– Hierarchical structure. A voucher owner can delegate a subset of his claims
to a new subject by creating a new voucher with less or equal validity period.
The parent vouchers are embedded within a child voucher. Therefore, the
veriﬁable iteration of parents provides a chain of trust.
– Conﬁdentiality. The subject cannot learn anything from the parent vouchers
because all of the parent vouchers are protected by hybrid encryption4.
– Stateless. The identity provider and servers store no information about ses-
sions and delegations (parent vouchers).
According to the JSON web tokens (JWT) [15] representation, there are
three types of claims: registered, public and private.
Listing 1.1. Voucher payload
{
parent : Enc ( parent vouchers ) ,
j t i : a voucher unique i d e n t i f i e r ,
i s s : the i s s u e r i d en t i t y ,
sub : the sub j e c t i d en t i t y ,
i a t : the i s s u i n g time ,
exp : the exp i r a t i on time
wf i : the workflow i d e n t i f i e r ,
wei : the eng ine i d e n t i f i e r ,
a c t i on s : the l i s t o f a l lowed ac t i on s
}
The registered and public claims are predeﬁned in the standard [15], e.g.
jti, iss, sub, iat and exp (see Listing 1.1). We extended the representation
by adding extra ﬁelds such as parent, wfi, wei and actions in the form of
private claims. The parent ﬁeld is the issuer’s voucher encrypted using a hybrid
encryption scheme with the public key of an identity provider (WF-Interop).
The wfi and wei are the unique identiﬁers of the workﬂow and the responsible
2 In BPO, entity can be a person, a group, a department or a workﬂow engine.
Attributes of an entity can be an email address, a public key or a randomly generated
value.
3 Using cryptographic signatures the integrity of the voucher and the authenticity of
the issuer are guaranteed.
4 This scheme is a mix of a public-key cryptosystem with a symmetric-key crypto
system, e.g. OpenPGP.
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workﬂow engine. Lastly, the actions ﬁeld is a list of permitted actions that the
subject is able to execute.
The JWT representation [15] has three segments: a header, a payload and a
signature. Listing 1.1 represents the payload of a voucher. The header describes
the cryptographic operations applied to the JWT [14] token, e.g. the scheme used
in signatures. The third segment is the cryptographic signature as the vouchers
are secured.
In summary, we employed the JWT standard representation with extension
of embedded parent vouchers and BPO related ﬁelds as private claims.
Voucher Delegations. In this subsection, we describe an approach for delega-
tion of vouchers. The key diﬀerentiators are decentralised voucher generation,
iterative delegations and user-owned cryptographic keys.
In our running example, we use ﬁctional characters: Alice, Bob and Carol.
Each of the actors owns a pair of public-key cryptographic keys5 (pk, sk)
for voucher-based functionalities and a secret for authentication against WF-
Interop. WF-Interop is aware of the public keys (Pk’s), the secrets, the workﬂow
engines, and the workﬂows with all set of possible actions. The public keys of
the users are known to WF-Interop, however the private keys are only known to
the users. In addition, WF-Interop has its own pair of public and private keys.
The public key is broadcasted to all actors. Figure 3 illustrates voucher creation,
voucher usage and voucher delegation:
1. Voucher creation. Alice wants to create a voucher for Bob. (i) She creates a
voucher Vab by adding some claims including permitted actions (e.g. starting
a payment process), and (ii) signs it using her Sk. (iii) Afterwards, she sends
the voucher to Bob via WF-Interop over a secure channel. WF-Interop checks
the identiﬁer of the voucher because the voucher might have been revoked by
the issuer. In other words, WF-Interop only stores the identiﬁers of revoked
vouchers.
2. Voucher usage. Bob wants to perform an action on a secure workﬂow engine
which is authorised by Alice using the voucher Vab. (i) He sends the execution
request to the engine via WF-Interop along with his secret and the voucher.
Before execution, (ii) WF-Interop veriﬁes the authenticity of Vab and validates
that whether Bob’s claim to perform the action is available in the voucher
(refer to Sect. 3.1). (iii) Then it executes the actual request.
3. Voucher Delegation. Bob wants to delegate a subset of the permitted actions
from his voucher Vab to Carol. (i) He creates a voucher Vbc and adds some of
his claims to it. (ii) He encrypts the Vab with the public key of WF-Interop
using hybrid encryption and embeds it in the Vbc as the parent voucher. His
conﬁdentiality is protected as she is not able to see the complete set of his
claims within Vab. (iii) Afterwards, he sends Vbc to Carol via WF-Interop over
a secure channel. The validity period of the vouchers are less than (or equal
to) the validity of the parent vouchers.
5 Using a public key (pk), one can either encrypt a message or verify a signature and
with a private key (sk) one can either decrypt or sign a message.
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(1) Voucher creation
(2) Voucher usage
(3) Voucher delegation
1. Alice wants to generate a voucher for Bob.
2. Bob wants to use his voucher (Vab)
3. Bob wants to delegate a subset of his claims to
Carol.
Fig. 3. Voucher creation, usage, and delegation
In a BPO context, iterative and hierarchical delegation of vouchers is
unavoidable. For example, an accounting director may delegate her executive
tasks to the other employees; or a BPO provider engine may need to again out-
source some part of the process to another provider’s engine for special services.
Voucher Verifications. The WF-Interop security component veriﬁes the valid-
ity of the vouchers upon usage (e.g. see Fig. 3 when Bob wants to use his voucher).
Obviously, a voucher must contain the claim to access a resource that the request
initiator wants to have access to. Besides, the veriﬁcation procedure encompasses
three more criteria:
28 E.H. Beni et al.
– Chain of trust. WF-Interop is able to decrypt the embedded parent vouchers
and verify the signatures. The issuer of the child voucher must be the subject
of the parent voucher.
– Monotone decreasing access rights. Every child voucher must contain less/e-
qual claims than/to the chain of parents, meaning that there must be no
unknown claim in the set of claims.
– Identity assertions. The identity of the issuer must be the subject of the
parent voucher. Moreover, the provided secret adds a layer of authentication
to the veriﬁcation of the subject.
Ultimately if the veriﬁcation process succeeds, the delegatee gains access to
the requested resource on behalf of the delegator, e.g. starting an invoice delivery
process by Carol.
Voucher Renewal. Vouchers have a validity period which is set by the issuer.
A BPO provider’s voucher may expire before completing the business process,
e.g. a problem in the delivery of a bill may slow down a billing process. In such
a case, the subject requests the issuer(s) to renew the voucher.
Assume that Carol wants her voucher (Vbc) to be renewed. Vbc is issued by
Bob; and Vab, as the parent of Vbc, is issued by Alice iteratively. (1) Carol sends
a renewal request to WF-Interop along with Vbc and her secret; (2) WF-Interop
authenticates Alice using the provided secret; (3) then it recursively checks the
expiration time of the parents’ vouchers (Vab). If Bob’s Vab, as the ﬁrst parent
voucher, is still valid, it sends a renewal request to him. Otherwise, the request
will be sent to Alice. (4) The responsible issuer creates a new voucher and sends
it back to Carol via WF-Interop.
3.2 Secure Asynchronous Operations
Sometimes workﬂow engines perform BPO actions on external workﬂow engines
when the responsible user is not logged in. For example, there might be a timer in
the business process to start an instance at the service provider in the future; or
the client process inspects the progress of the outsourced workﬂow periodically
every 2 h; or the logged-in person is not the person with the right authority to
continue the execution. That means that the subject has no authenticated session
in the workﬂow engine at the time of a service invocation because the outsourced
processes are typically long running; in other words, the client workﬂow engine
cannot authenticate against the BPO provider engine to perform the authorised
actions.
There are two options to address this issue using vouchers. (i) The workﬂow
engine keeps the vouchers in the running process instance and impersonates the
subject at the execution time. In a more restricted case, (ii) the responsible
person may delegate a set of his access rights by creating a new child voucher
to the executing workﬂow engine or a person in charge for a speciﬁc amount of
time as described in Sect. 3.1.
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3.3 Secure HATEOAS Filtering
As described in Sect. 2.1, WF-Interop comprises a set of hypermedia-driven inter-
faces which are based on a principle called Hypermedia as the Engine of Appli-
cation State (HATEOAS) [2]. In brief, when a client accesses a resource at the
provider’s workﬂow engine, WF-Interop proposes a set of related resources to the
request initiator based on the (1) underlying workﬂow engine, (2) the type and
(3) the state of the running process instance. For example, when an accounting
manager starts a Reverse Factoring process, the accounting workﬂow engine
receives navigational information of the related resources such as pause, inspect
and cancel. In this case, an accountant should only be able to inspect the
progress without being able to cancel the process.
Client
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Fig. 4. Secure HATEOAS ﬁltering
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the HATEOAS component retrieves the related
resources from the storage mechanism of WF-Interop upon each action execution
on the provider’s workﬂow engine. Clients enable the secure ﬁltering component
to ﬁlter out the unauthorised resources by passing along their vouchers to the
BPO interfaces of WF-Interop. In other words, a client only receives a set of per-
mitted resources, which are securely included in the given voucher, as HATEOAS
propositions.
4 Validation and Illustration
As a validation of the principles and architecture of the voucher-based authen-
tication and authorisation in a BPO context, we prototyped an accounting
workﬂow with an outsourced billing workﬂow on top of the WF-Interop mid-
dleware [2]. The goal of this validation is to illustrate a decentralised, cross-
organisational authorisation mechanism to support long-term remote interac-
tions between heterogeneous workﬂow technologies.
To implement the accounting case study, we employed the jBPM workﬂow
engine for the accounting process and the Ruote workﬂow engine for the billing
process. They communicate via the WF-Interop middleware (see Fig. 6). Figure 5
illustrates a simpliﬁed accounting workﬂow responsible for starting a process at a
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Fig. 5. Outsourcing a billing process in jBPM workﬂow engine.
billing provider (not shown in the ﬁgure) and inspecting the progress periodically,
as well as a subprocess for creation or delegation of the vouchers.
The accountant is the business owner holding a voucher (Va). (1) He delegates
some privileges to the billing provider by creating a voucher (Vab) (e.g. by adding
a claim enabling the billing provider to start a process at his trusted package
delivery service.). Then he starts a billing process at the billing provider by
providing Va and Vab. Using Va WF-Interop authorises the action and passes
the Vab to the billing provider for further BPO interactions in the future. (2) In
the second stage, the client workﬂow engine is responsible to track the progress
of the billing process which may take weeks. To start the periodic progress
inspection, the workﬂow engine needs to have a voucher in order to be authorised
against WF-Interop. Therefore, the accountant delegates the progress inspection
privilege as a claim by creating a voucher Vae for the responsible workﬂow engine.
Then the workﬂow engine performs the inspection by passing Vae to WF-Interop.
As long as the voucher is still valid (not rejected by WF-Interop because of the
validity period or voucher revocation), it inspects the progress. As soon as the
voucher is expired, the voucher must be renewed by the accountant.
The main goal of this validation is to show (i) that the BPO client (account-
ing workﬂow) creates a voucher for delegation of a subset of their resources
to the BPO provider for further usage; (ii) hierarchical, intra-organisational
voucher delegations among entities (e.g. between the accountant and the work-
ﬂow engine); (iii) secure asynchronous and impersonated operations when the
business owner is oﬄine (e.g. the periodic progress inspections by the workﬂow
engine when the accountant is not logged in). (iv) The WF-Interop HATEOAS
propositions within responses (not shown in the ﬁgure) are limited to the exist-
ing claims inside the vouchers (e.g. upon each invocation, the workﬂow engine
is informed that it can only execute the progress inspection).
Furthermore, WF-Interop performs the veriﬁcation procedure on the dele-
gated actions based on the given vouchers. In other words, it stores no infor-
mation about the access rights of the delegatees in order to be stateless and to
respect organisational conﬁdentiality according to the speciﬁc structure of the
vouchers as described in Sect. 3.1.
A Voucher-Based Security Middleware for Secure BPO 31
5 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance impact of vouchers with vary-
ing number of delegations. More precisely, we evaluate the progress inspection
requests on an outsourced process.
Set-up. To evaluate the performance overhead of vouchers, we implemented a
security interceptor on top of the REST interfaces of the WF-Interop middle-
ware. Since the voucher veriﬁcation is the most recurring routine compared to
the other activities, the progress inspection on the Ruote workﬂow engine is
the target of this evaluation. Both the WF-Interop middleware and the security
interceptor are written in Java using Spring Boot. The cryptographic schemes
employed in the set-up for the hybrid encryption of parent vouchers are based
on both RSA or Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography in separate experiments, inte-
grated with AES symmetric encryption algorithm. Voucher signatures are also
implemented using RSA or EC6.
Fig. 6. Outsourcing a billing process. Fig. 7. Performance evaluation set-up.
As illustrated in Fig. 7, a client sends a request to a Ruote workﬂow engine via
the WF-Interop middleware to inspect the progress of a process. The procedure
contains three sub-routines: (1) voucher veriﬁcation, (2) process inspection and
(3) HATEOAS ﬁltering. We executed the procedure 500 times for diﬀerent cases:
using no voucher, as well as using vouchers with 1 to 6 delegations.
As illustrated in Fig. 8, the process inspection (baseline) has constant exe-
cution time of 5.27ms. The HATEOAS ﬁltering has low impact of maximum
2.99ms with six delegations. Therefore, the main performance overhead is on
6 The RSA-based hybrid encryption is based on RSA/OAEP with AES/GCM, SHA-
256 and MGF1 padding. The EC-based hybrid encryption is based on ECIES with
AES/CBC, HMAC-SHA256, KDF2 and ECSVDP-DH (Elliptic Curve Secret Value
Derivation Primitive [7,16]). The RSA-based signature algorithms are based on
RS256 and RS512 and the EC-based ones are ES256, ES384 and ES512 [15].
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Fig. 8. The setup employs 4096 bits
key size for RSA-based hybrid encryp-
tion and voucher signatures.
Fig. 9. Diﬀerent setups employ various
hybrid encryption and signature algo-
rithms for voucher veriﬁcation.
voucher veriﬁcation. Considering a growing number of delegations, the signature
veriﬁcation of vouchers, as well as decryption and veriﬁcation of parent vouchers
are the main reasons for the performance overhead.
Results. The experiment results which are presented in Fig. 8 shows the worst-
case scenario because we employed a set of strong encryption schemes with large
key lengths. We also evaluated the overhead against the fastest WF-Interop func-
tion (namely process inspection). In a BPO context, these performance results
can be considered low as the number of delegations rarely becomes six. The total
response time of 282.73ms is still acceptable in a BPO context.
We further evaluated the same experiments with diﬀerent key lengths using
RSA-based hybrid encryption, or Elliptic Curve integrated encryption scheme
(ECIES) with various signature algorithms (see Fig. 9). The results show that the
execution time of voucher veriﬁcation is considerably improved from 274.47ms
to 81.92ms in the case of 6 delegations. The detailed experiment results are
provided in the appendix.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a voucher-based authorisation architecture and mid-
dleware for BPO. Vouchers enable federated workﬂow systems to iteratively
delegate all or subsets of claims to diﬀerent entities. Nested vouchers protect
the conﬁdentiality of the parent issuers by using hybrid encryption, which is
important in a cross-organisational context. Moreover, vouchers facilitate the
asynchronous BPO operations in long-running workﬂows when the authorised
subject has no active session in the workﬂow engine. We employed vouchers to ﬁl-
ter the Hypermedia as the Engine of Application State (HATEOAS) propositions
using an interceptor pattern in the WF-Interop middleware. We implemented a
security module for the middleware and, on top of it, validated the architecture
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by prototyping a billing workﬂow case study. Furthermore, the evaluation showed
that the measured performance overhead is acceptable in a BPO context.
The current centralised approach suﬀers from a single point of failure issue,
but on the other hand, some of the important security controls such as voucher
revocation and context-sensitive delegations can practically be employed in the
current design. Our future work includes moving towards a decentralised archi-
tecture, and addressing potential limitations such as key management issues,
context-sensitive and ﬁne-grained controls on delegations by resource owners in
that setting.
A Appendix
See Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1. The setup employs 4096 bits key size for RSA-based hybrid encryption and
voucher signatures. Execution times (ms) are as follows.
Number of delegations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Process inspection 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27
Voucher veriﬁcation 0 28.28 73.02 117.36 164.26 214.22 274.47
Hateoas ﬁltering 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.99 1.16 2.99
Total 5.54 33.82 78.56 123.02 170.52 220.65 282.73
Table 2. Diﬀerent setups employ various hybrid encryption and signature algorithms
for voucher veriﬁcation. Execution times (ms) are as follows.
Number of delegations 1 2 3 4 5 6
ECIES P-256 - ES256 27.63 28.89 30.31 32.87 36.79 42.68
ECIES P-384 - ES384 33.28 35.30 40.29 46.50 53.82 64.07
ECIES P-521 - ES512 35.19 39.30 46.77 56.21 66.26 81.92
RSA 2048 bits - RS256 24.48 32.61 39.02 47.13 57.45 72.30
RSA 4096 bits - RS512 28.28 73.02 117.36 164.26 214.22 274.47
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